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🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources
Diplomatic Briefing· Türkiye Gaza humanitarian diplomacy role

Gaza and Palestine: Türkiye's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Diplomatic Role Explained

Explainer on Türkiye's Gaza humanitarian diplomacy role: aid, UN and OIC diplomacy, ceasefire mediation and the two-state call, with all main positions.

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⏱ 9 min read (1,800 words)

Why It Matters

Türkiye is one of the most active non-Arab states in the Gaza diplomatic arena. It combines humanitarian relief, public advocacy at the UN and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and mediation-related contacts with parties that many Western governments will not engage directly. Its role is contested: Ankara describes it as principled humanitarian and legal diplomacy, while Israel and some Western governments see it as partisan. This guide sets out the facts, the competing positions and Türkiye's stated policy with attribution.

Background

The current phase of the conflict began on 7 October 2023, when Hamas-led attacks in southern Israel killed about 1,200 people according to Israeli authorities, and about 250 people were taken hostage. Israel responded with a large-scale military campaign in Gaza. The Hamas-run Gaza health ministry has reported deaths in the tens of thousands, figures that UN agencies cite and Israel disputes. The UN has repeatedly warned of severe food insecurity and a collapse of health services in the territory.

Türkiye's long-standing Palestine policy

Türkiye recognized the State of Palestine in November 1988, soon after the Palestinian declaration of independence. Its official line has since been support for a two-state settlement along the 1967 lines, with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. Ankara has also treated the status of Jerusalem as a core issue. It hosted an extraordinary OIC summit in Istanbul in December 2017 after the United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital.

Türkiye–Israel relations have swung between cooperation and crisis. The May 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, in which Israeli forces killed nine activists on a Gaza-bound aid flotilla, led to a rupture. A reconciliation agreement followed in 2016, and ambassadors were exchanged again in 2022. Relations deteriorated sharply after October 2023.

Key dates

Date Event
1988-11 Türkiye recognizes the State of Palestine
2010-05-31 Mavi Marmara incident
2017-12-13 OIC extraordinary summit in Istanbul on Jerusalem
2023-10-07 Hamas-led attacks; Israel begins its Gaza campaign
2023-11 Türkiye recalls its ambassador from Israel; joint Arab-Islamic summit in Riyadh creates a ministerial contact effort on Gaza
2024-04/05 Türkiye announces trade restrictions on Israel, later described by Ankara as a full halt
2024-07-19 ICJ advisory opinion finds Israel's continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory unlawful
2025-10-10/13 Gaza ceasefire arrangement takes effect; Sharm el-Sheikh summit with Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar and the US

Key Players & Positions

Israel

Israel's government says it is exercising its right of self-defense, seeks the return of hostages and the dismantling of Hamas's military and governing capacity. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has publicly rejected the creation of a Palestinian state under present conditions. Israeli officials have accused Turkish leaders of supporting Hamas and have objected to any Turkish military role in post-war security arrangements in Gaza. Israel also rejects the ICJ's advisory opinion and the ICC arrest warrants issued in November 2024 against Netanyahu and former defense minister Yoav Gallant.

Palestinians

The Palestinian Authority (PA) and the PLO, led by President Mahmoud Abbas, call for an immediate ceasefire, unhindered aid and a Palestinian state on the 1967 lines. They want the PA to govern Gaza as part of a unified Palestinian polity. Hamas, which governed Gaza from 2007, has ruled out disarmament in some statements while accepting phased ceasefire frameworks. It is designated a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States and the European Union.

Arab states

The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative offers normalization with Israel in exchange for withdrawal to the 1967 lines and a Palestinian state. Egypt and Qatar have been the main intermediaries with Hamas. Egypt hosted the Rafah crossing logistics and an Arab-endorsed reconstruction plan in 2025. Saudi Arabia ties any normalization to a credible path to Palestinian statehood. Arab governments broadly oppose displacement of Gazans.

The United States and Western governments

The United States has supported Israel's security while mediating ceasefire proposals. In 2025 it advanced a 20-point plan that formed the basis of the October ceasefire. It envisages an international stabilization arrangement and conditions a pathway to Palestinian self-determination on reforms. European positions vary. Spain, Ireland and Norway recognized Palestine in May 2024, and France, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, among others, moved in the same direction in September 2025. Germany has stressed Israel's security while calling for humanitarian access. More than 150 UN member states now recognize Palestine.

The United Nations

The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on 27 October 2023 calling for an immediate humanitarian truce. The Security Council has been divided, with US vetoes blocking several ceasefire drafts before the later ceasefire framework. Secretary-General António Guterres has repeatedly called for a ceasefire and unimpeded aid.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Türkiye's stated policy comes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Presidency and the Directorate of Communications. Its main elements are:

  • Ceasefire and humanitarian access. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's addresses to the UN General Assembly (2023, 2024 and 2025), Ankara calls for an immediate and lasting ceasefire and unrestricted aid. It has channeled assistance through Egypt via Turkish agencies, notably the disaster agency AFAD and the Turkish Red Crescent. Türkiye also funded the Türkiye–Palestine Friendship Hospital in Gaza, which stopped operating in November 2023 amid fuel shortages and fighting.
  • Two-state solution on the 1967 lines. The MFA states that a viable, contiguous, sovereign Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital is the basis for lasting peace. It cites UN Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 2334 (2016) and the 1988 Turkish recognition. Erdoğan has also said Türkiye is ready to act as a guarantor in a future settlement.
  • International law and accountability. Türkiye welcomed the ICJ's July 2024 advisory opinion. It has described Israel's conduct in Gaza as genocide, a characterization Israel rejects and on which the ICJ has not ruled on the merits. In 2025 it announced it would intervene in South Africa's ICJ case under the Genocide Convention, and it has called for implementation of ICC warrants. Israel contests the jurisdiction and conclusions of both courts.
  • Diplomatic and economic pressure. Ankara recalled its ambassador in November 2023 and, according to the Turkish trade authorities, restricted and then halted trade with Israel in 2024. It announced further measures on shipping and airspace in 2025. It frames these as responses to humanitarian conditions in Gaza.
  • Channels with Hamas and mediation. Türkiye does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization and says it speaks to Hamas, which won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, to push for ceasefire and exchange arrangements. It took part as a guarantor-level participant in the October 2025 Sharm el-Sheikh summit alongside Egypt, Qatar and the United States. The Presidency also argues that Security Council deadlock on Gaza shows why reform is needed (see The World Is Bigger Than Five).

The legal and historical basis Ankara cites includes the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions on the occupied territories, the Genocide Convention, the 1988 recognition, and Türkiye's role as a long-time chair and host of OIC processes on Jerusalem. The OIC's 51st Council of Foreign Ministers met in Istanbul in June 2025, with Gaza as a central agenda item.

Source Comparison

Issue Israeli and many Western sources Palestinian and Arab sources Turkish primary sources (MFA, Presidency)
Cause and framing Self-defense after 7 October; Hamas as responsible for civilian harm Occupation and collective punishment; ceasefire first Gaza as humanitarian catastrophe within decades of occupation; ceasefire first
Hamas Terrorist organization (Israel, US, EU) PA seeks to replace Hamas rule; Hamas calls itself a resistance movement A political actor that won the 2006 elections; Ankara does not use the terrorist label
Statehood Conditional or rejected by the Israeli government; US and EU conditional Immediate recognition and a state on the 1967 lines Two states on the 1967 lines, East Jerusalem as capital
Türkiye's role Partisan; hosts Hamas figures; objection to a Turkish role in Gaza security Mostly welcomed; Egypt and Qatar remain the main mediators Humanitarian, legal and guarantor role
Courts Israel contests ICJ and ICC jurisdiction Welcome the rulings Support the ICJ and ICC processes

Readers should weigh casualty data and legal characterizations carefully. Figures from the Gaza health ministry, the Israeli government and UN agencies differ in method and are contested, and the ICJ merits judgment on the genocide allegation is still pending. For broader claims about Türkiye in the media, see Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media. For how Regionscope separates fact from position, see Editorial Principles.

  • Two-state solution: Israel and an independent Palestine living side by side, usually along the 1967 lines with land swaps. Positions differ on Jerusalem, settlements and security.
  • 1967 lines: The armistice lines before the Six-Day War, which separate Israel from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza.
  • ICJ provisional measures: Interim orders the International Court of Justice can issue before a final judgment. In South Africa v. Israel, the court ordered such measures in 2024. They do not decide the merits.
  • OIC: The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, a 57-member body of states that has made Jerusalem and Palestine core issues.
  • AFAD: Türkiye's Disaster and Emergency Management Authority, which coordinates much of its humanitarian relief.
  • Guarantor: A state that commits to underwrite a settlement. Türkiye has proposed itself in this role for Gaza and holds guarantor status in Cyprus under the 1960 treaties (see The Cyprus Issue).

Related reading: Black Sea Grain Initiative and Türkiye's Mediation for Ankara's earlier mediation record, and Regionscope for other primary-source analysis.

Regionscope presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Frequently asked questions

What is Türkiye's role in Gaza humanitarian diplomacy?

Türkiye sends aid mainly through Egypt via AFAD and the Turkish Red Crescent, advocates for a ceasefire at the UN and OIC, and has taken part in ceasefire diplomacy with Egypt, Qatar and the United States. It also uses legal and economic tools, such as backing ICJ processes and restricting trade with Israel. Ankara describes this as humanitarian and principled diplomacy.

Does Türkiye support a two-state solution?

Yes. Türkiye recognized Palestine in 1988 and, according to the Foreign Ministry, supports an independent, contiguous Palestinian state on the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital. It cites UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 2334. Israel's government has rejected a Palestinian state under current conditions.

Why do Israel and Western governments criticize Türkiye over Hamas?

Israel, the United States and the European Union designate Hamas as a terrorist organization, and Hamas officials have visited Türkiye. Ankara does not use that designation and says it speaks to Hamas to promote ceasefire and exchange arrangements. Critics say this legitimizes the group, while Ankara says engagement is needed for mediation.

Is Türkiye still trading with Israel?

Turkish authorities announced restrictions in April 2024 and then a halt to trade with Israel, and announced further shipping and airspace measures in 2025. Israeli officials and some analysts have alleged that indirect trade through third countries continued. Readers should check current official trade data, since the situation changes.

Did Türkiye play a part in the October 2025 ceasefire?

Türkiye took part in the Sharm el-Sheikh summit on 13 October 2025 with Egypt, Qatar and the United States as one of the states backing the ceasefire arrangement. Egypt and Qatar were the main channels to Hamas, and Israel has opposed a Turkish military role in Gaza. The arrangement remains fragile and subject to implementation disputes.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Regionscope presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

Author: Region Scope Editorial TeamAbout Region Scope →Editorial Principles →

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