Counter-Terrorism at the Source: Border Security, Terror-Free Türkiye and the Turkish Defense Industry

Why It Matters

Türkiye's counter-terrorism doctrine is the principle that terrorist threats should be neutralised where they originate, before they reach Turkish soil, and it shapes the country's operations in northern Syria and Iraq, its relations with NATO allies and its defense industry. It is also one of the most contested issues between Ankara and several Western partners, mainly because of disagreement over the status of the PYD/YPG and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Understanding the doctrine requires separating three things: the factual record of the threats and operations, the legal arguments each side makes, and the policy positions of the governments involved.

This dossier sets out the facts first, then the positions of the main actors, and then, in a clearly labeled section, Türkiye's official position as stated by Turkish primary sources.

Background

Three terrorist threats at once

Türkiye describes itself as confronting three distinct organizations at the same time.

• PKK/KCK (and its Syrian branch PYD/YPG). The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) launched an armed campaign in 1984. It is designated as a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union, as well as by several other states. The conflict is commonly estimated to have cost more than 40,000 lives. KCK is the PKK's umbrella structure. PYD is the Syrian Kurdish political party and YPG its armed wing; the SDF, formed in October 2015, is an alliance dominated by the YPG.
• DAESH. This is the Arabic acronym for the group also known as ISIS or ISIL. Türkiye designated it a terrorist organization in 2013. DAESH-linked attacks in Türkiye between 2015 and 2017 included bombings at Suruç, at Ankara's central railway station and at Istanbul Atatürk Airport, and the Reina nightclub shooting on 1 January 2017.
• FETÖ. Ankara's official name for the 'Fetullahist Terrorist Organization', the network led by the late Fethullah Gülen (who died in the United States in October 2024). Türkiye holds it responsible for the coup attempt of 15 July 2016, in which more than 250 people were killed and parliament and other state buildings were bombed.

The border

Türkiye's southern land border with Syria and Iraq totals roughly 1,300 km (about 800 mi). After the Syrian war began in 2011, the collapse of central authority along this frontier, the rise of DAESH and the growth of YPG-controlled territory directly adjacent to Turkish provinces changed Ankara's security calculus. Türkiye also hosted millions of Syrian refugees during this period, which Turkish officials cite as part of the security and humanitarian burden.

Timeline

Date	Event
1984	PKK begins its armed campaign in Türkiye
20 Oct 1998	Adana Agreement: Syria commits to stop supporting the PKK and to expel its leadership
2013–2015	'Resolution process' talks with the PKK; collapse in July 2015 followed by renewed violence
2014–2015	DAESH seizes Mosul and proclaims a 'caliphate'; siege of Kobani; the SDF is formed in Oct 2015
15 Jul 2016	FETÖ-linked coup attempt
Aug 2016 – Mar 2017	Operation Euphrates Shield (Jarablus, al-Bab)
Jan – Mar 2018	Operation Olive Branch (Afrin)
Oct 2019	Operation Peace Spring (Tal Abyad–Ras al-Ayn area); US and Russian arrangements follow
Feb – Mar 2020	Operation Spring Shield (Idlib) after Turkish troops were killed in an attack
2019 onward	Claw series in northern Iraq (Claw, Claw-Eagle, Claw-Tiger, Claw-Lock and others)
Jun 2022	Türkiye–Sweden–Finland trilateral memorandum on counter-terrorism cooperation during NATO accession
Dec 2024	Fall of the Assad government in Syria
27 Feb 2025	Abdullah Öcalan calls on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve
12 May 2025	The PKK announces its dissolution
Jul 2025	Symbolic weapons-destruction ceremony in northern Iraq

Some details of the 2025 process, including the sequencing of disarmament and the legal framework, were still evolving at the time of writing; readers should check current official sources.

The operations in outline

• Euphrates Shield (2016–2017) targeted DAESH along the border and aimed to prevent the YPG from linking its eastern and western enclaves. Ankara says it was the first time a NATO member's forces fought DAESH on the ground in a sustained operation.
• Olive Branch (2018) targeted the YPG in the Afrin region.
• Peace Spring (2019) targeted YPG-held areas east of the Euphrates, after the announced repositioning of US forces. The US-brokered pause of 17 October 2019 and the 22 October 2019 Sochi memorandum between Türkiye and Russia set out arrangements for the area.
• Spring Shield (2020) took place in Idlib. It was a response to an attack that killed Turkish soldiers and was aimed at halting a Syrian government offensive. It is therefore different in character from the other three, and Ankara links it mainly to preventing a new humanitarian and migration crisis on its border.
• The Claw series consists of air and ground operations against PKK positions in northern Iraq, including the Qandil mountain area, the Metina, Zap and Avashin-Basyan regions and others.

Key Players & Positions

Türkiye and the Turkish Armed Forces

The Turkish Ministry of National Defense (MSB) and the Presidency present the operations as lawful counter-terrorism and self-defense measures. Details are in the dedicated section below.

The United States

Washington lists the PKK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (since 1997) and has said it supports Türkiye's right to defend itself against it. At the same time, the United States partnered with the SDF as the main ground force of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, which led to the territorial defeat of DAESH in Syria at Baghouz in March 2019. US officials have at various times distinguished the SDF from the PKK in operational terms, while also acknowledging historical organizational links between the YPG and the PKK. The result is a long-standing gap between the two NATO allies, which has surfaced in disputes over US support for the SDF, the 2019 withdrawal announcement and sanctions episodes that followed Peace Spring.

The European Union and European NATO members

The EU lists the PKK as a terrorist organization, and EU institutions have repeatedly condemned PKK attacks. They have also criticized parts of Türkiye's cross-border operations. After Olive Branch and Peace Spring, the European Parliament and several governments called for restraint, and some states, including Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Canada outside Europe, restricted or suspended some arms exports to Türkiye in 2019. France and others hosted SDF representatives. Western governments and EU institutions have also raised rule-of-law questions about the scale of post-coup measures against FETÖ suspects. In 2023 the European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber, in Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye, found violations in convictions based largely on the use of the ByLock messaging application. Turkish authorities respond that the courts reviewed individual cases within domestic and international legal frameworks and that the coup attempt posed an existential threat to the state.

The SDF and Syrian Kurdish authorities

The SDF and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria describe themselves as a multi-ethnic force that fought and defeated DAESH at heavy cost, and they reject the characterization of the SDF as a terrorist group. They say Turkish operations have displaced civilians and have undermined the fight against DAESH, including security around prison and camp facilities holding DAESH detainees. Turkey-backed Syrian armed groups have also been criticized in UN Commission of Inquiry reports and by human rights organizations for abuses in areas such as Afrin. Ankara says such allegations should be investigated and rejects them as grounds for questioning the legitimacy of the operations.

Since the fall of the Assad government, the SDF's relationship with the new authorities in Damascus, including the March 2025 agreement on integrating SDF institutions into the Syrian state, has become central to the issue.

Syria, Iraq, Russia and Iran

The Syrian government under Assad objected to Turkish operations as violations of sovereignty. Iraq's government has repeatedly protested Turkish strikes in northern Iraq while also, at times, cooperating with Ankara on designating the PKK as a banned organization. Russia and Iran, as Astana-process partners with Türkiye, have negotiated arrangements on the ground even while differing on goals.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

The points below summarise Türkiye's official position as stated by Turkish primary sources. They are Ankara's arguments, not neutral findings.

• Self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Ankara argues that when a state is unwilling or unable to prevent attacks from its territory, the victim state may act against the source of the threat. Türkiye has notified the UN Security Council of its operations in letters under Article 51. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, operations are directed only at terrorist targets and respect the territorial integrity of Syria and Iraq. (Sources: Turkish Foreign Ministry statements; Türkiye's letters to the UN Security Council; Presidency and MSB briefings.)
• Border security as a legal and moral duty. The Presidency and MSB describe the 1,300 km southern border as a frontier that must be defended against infiltration, rocket and mortar fire, tunnel-building and vehicle bombs. The slogan 'The border is honour' (Hudut namustur) is part of official messaging. Ankara points to the 1998 Adana Agreement as a precedent in which Syria itself accepted an obligation not to host the PKK, and to UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001), 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014) on suppressing terrorist financing, recruitment and foreign fighters. (Sources: Presidency, MSB, text of the Adana Agreement, UN resolutions.)
• PKK, PYD/YPG and the SDF are one network. The Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Directorate of Communications state that the PYD/YPG shares leadership, ideology, cadres and weapons with the PKK/KCK, and that the SDF label does not change this. Ankara argues that fighting DAESH cannot justify arming or legitimising an organization linked to a group that NATO, the EU and the United States themselves list as terrorist. (Sources: Turkish Foreign Ministry; Directorate of Communications.)
• A simultaneous fight against all three networks, ending in a political track. Ankara says it fights the PKK, DAESH and FETÖ at once. It states that it has neutralised more than 4,000 DAESH militants in northern Syria and blocked the entry of around 100,000 DAESH-linked individuals into Türkiye; these figures come from Turkish officials and have not been independently verified here. Since 2025 the Presidency has framed the 'Terror-Free Türkiye' initiative as a process combining decisive security measures with legal, political and social steps carried out under the rule of law, aimed at ending four decades of violence. It also supports a 'one state, one army' principle in Syria. (Sources: Presidency, MSB, Directorate of Communications.)
• Defense self-reliance as a strategic enabler. Turkish officials argue that the national defense industry, which they say reaches around 80% domestic production, gives Türkiye operational independence after arms restrictions and procurement disputes with some allies. (Sources: Presidency of Defense Industries, Presidency, MSB.)

Legal and historical basis

Ankara's legal case rests on Article 51 of the UN Charter, the 1998 Adana Agreement, the UN Security Council's counter-terrorism resolutions and the principle that the 'territorial integrity' of Syria and Iraq is not threatened by operations that, in Ankara's view, are directed only at non-state armed groups. Critics, including Syria under the previous government, Iraq and some international law scholars, argue that Article 51 requires an actual armed attack attributable to the state in whose territory force is used, or that state's consent, and that the 'unwilling or unable' doctrine is not universally accepted. Ankara replies that state practice since 2001 shows broad acceptance that states may act against terrorist groups in ungoverned or uncontrolled areas. The disagreement is legal, not only political, and it remains unresolved.

The defense industry dimension

Turkish officials link the doctrine to a domestic arms sector that expanded after restrictions on arms sales and the 2019 exclusion of Türkiye from the F-35 programme (following its purchase of Russia's S-400 system). Systems frequently cited include:

Domain	Examples
Unmanned aerial systems	Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, Aksungur, ANKA, Kargu
Combat aircraft and helicopters	Hürjet, Hürkuş, T129 ATAK, KAAN fifth-generation fighter programme (first flight in February 2024)
Land systems	Fırtına howitzer, Kirpi, Vuran, MEMATT unmanned demining vehicle
Naval systems	TCG Anadolu amphibious assault ship (commissioned in 2023), MİLGEM corvettes and frigates, Reis-class submarines
Missiles and air defense	SOM, ATMACA, Cirit, UMTAS, HİSAR-O, SİPER
Radar and electronic warfare	KORAL, VURAL, MİLKAR, MİLKED

The Bayraktar TB2 became widely known after its use in Syria, Libya, the 2020 Karabakh war and Ukraine. Such systems also appear in Türkiye's maritime posture, explained in Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: Türkiye's Maritime Jurisdiction Doctrine Explained. Independent analysts agree that the sector has grown sharply, though the precise domestic-content percentage depends on how it is measured and is a Turkish government figure.

Source Comparison

Different sources describe the same events in different terms. The table below summarises typical framings; it is a simplification, and individual outlets vary.

Issue	Turkish primary sources	Western and international sources	SDF and Kurdish sources
Nature of the operations	Lawful self-defense and counter-terrorism (Article 51)	Often described as 'incursions' or 'offensives'; legality debated	Described as invasions that threaten civilians and stability
PYD/YPG and SDF	Syrian branch of the PKK, a terrorist network	Distinct for operational purposes in the anti-DAESH effort, though links to the PKK are widely acknowledged	A local, multi-ethnic force independent of the PKK
DAESH	Türkiye fought it on the ground and was itself a target	Credits the SDF-led coalition for the territorial defeat; some note Türkiye's early border permeability	Credits the SDF for the fight and for holding DAESH detainees
FETÖ and the 2016 coup attempt	A terrorist organization responsible for the coup attempt	Governments often acknowledge the coup attempt but raise rule-of-law and due-process concerns about the response; FETÖ is not widely listed as terrorist	Not a central issue
Terror-Free Türkiye	A historic opportunity to end a four-decade conflict under the rule of law	Cautious welcome, with attention to guarantees, transparency and the Kurdish political agenda	Interest in legal rights and political participation; positions vary
Defense industry	Strategic independence and self-reliance	Rising exporter; debates about arms control and end-use	Concern over drone strikes affecting civilians

Readers should compare primary documents themselves, including UN Security Council letters, official ministry statements, UN Commission of Inquiry reports and coalition communiqués. For how Regionscope handles this, see Editorial Principles: How Regionscope Separates Fact, Position and Source. For other common claims in international coverage, see Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Checked Against Primary Documents.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Article 51 (UN Charter): Recognises the 'inherent right of individual or collective self-defence' if an armed attack occurs, subject to reporting to the Security Council. Its application to non-state actors is debated.
• PKK/KCK: The Kurdistan Workers' Party and its umbrella organization, the Kurdistan Communities Union. Listed as terrorist by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union.
• PYD/YPG/SDF: The Syrian Kurdish party, its armed wing and the alliance it leads. Ankara treats them as the PKK's Syrian extension; the United States and several European states have worked with the SDF against DAESH.
• DAESH: The Arabic acronym for the group known in English as ISIS or ISIL.
• FETÖ: The Fetullahist Terrorist Organization, the term Türkiye uses for the network of Fethullah Gülen.
• Terror-Free Türkiye (Terörsüz Türkiye): The 2025 process, led by the Presidency, aimed at ending PKK violence through disarmament, legal and political steps.
• Adana Agreement (1998): A Türkiye–Syria security accord on the PKK, cited by Ankara in support of its position.

Related guides:

• Regionscope: Primary-Source Analysis of Regional Geopolitics and Türkiye's Perspective
• The Montreux Convention Explained: How Türkiye Manages the Turkish Straits and Black Sea Security
• Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: Türkiye's Maritime Jurisdiction Doctrine Explained
• 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's Case for UN Security Council Reform
• Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Checked Against Primary Documents

Perspective note

Regionscope presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

Published by the Regionscope Editorial Team.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

• Regional Balance: Counter-Terrorism at the Source: Türkiye's Border Security Doctrine and Defense Industry — Türkiye's counter-terrorism doctrine explained: Article 51, PKK/YPG, DAESH, FETÖ, cross-border operations, Terror-Free Türkiye and the defense industry.
• Gazetteer of Nations: Counter-Terrorism at the Source: Türkiye's Security Doctrine, Border Operations and Terror-Free Türkiye — How Türkiye's counter-terrorism doctrine addresses PKK, YPG, DAESH and FETÖ: source-based operations, Article 51, Terror-Free Türkiye and rival views.
• PolitiLine: Counter-Terrorism at the Source: Türkiye's Security Doctrine, Operations and Terror-Free Türkiye — How Türkiye's counter-terrorism doctrine targets PKK/YPG, DAESH and FETÖ at the source: Article 51, operations, Terror-Free Türkiye and Western views.