Diplomatic Briefing· Black Sea Grain Initiative Türkiye mediation role

Black Sea Grain Initiative and Türkiye's Russia–Ukraine Mediation: What Happened and Why

How the Black Sea Grain Initiative came about, who brokered it, what Türkiye's mediation role was, and where Russia–Ukraine talks stand after the deal lapsed.

By Region Scope Editorial Team

Published: October 26, 2026

⏱ 9 min read (1,945 words)

The Brief — Key Takeaways

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022 by Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the United Nations, and was brokered jointly by the UN and Türkiye.
UN figures put exports under the deal at roughly 33 million tonnes of grain and other foodstuffs from Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi between August 2022 and July 2023; Turkish officials cite more than 33 million tons.
Russia announced on 17 July 2023 that it would not extend the deal, citing unmet demands on its own food and fertilizer exports; Ukraine and the UN said the deal's own terms had been honoured.
The 1936 Montreux Convention did not create the grain corridor, but Türkiye's neutral implementation of it, including closing the Straits to belligerent warships since 28 February 2022, helped make Istanbul an acceptable venue for both sides.
Istanbul remained a negotiating venue after the deal lapsed, hosting direct Russia–Ukraine delegation talks in 2025 that produced large prisoner exchanges.

Why It Matters

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was brokered by the United Nations and Türkiye and signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022. It allowed Ukrainian grain and other foodstuffs to leave three Black Sea ports under a joint inspection system, and about 33 million tonnes of cargo moved before Russia suspended its participation on 17 July 2023.

It is one of very few wartime arrangements in which Moscow and Kyiv both signed on to a practical, verifiable mechanism, and it shaped how governments and media see Türkiye's role as a mediator. Understanding who did what, and where accounts diverge, is essential to judging whether the deal can be revived.

Background

Why the Black Sea mattered

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 halted commercial shipping from Ukraine's Black Sea ports. Ukraine and Russia are both major exporters of wheat, maize, sunflower oil and fertilizer, and the UN and the World Food Programme (WFP) warned that blocked exports would worsen food insecurity and price spikes, particularly in import-dependent countries in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. Estimates at the time put the amount of grain stranded in Ukrainian ports at over 20 million tonnes.

Chronology

Date	Event
2022-02-24	Russia launches its full-scale invasion; Ukrainian ports close to commercial shipping.
2022-02-28	Türkiye announces it is applying Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, restricting passage of belligerent states' warships through the Straits.
2022-03-10	Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu hosts Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba in Antalya, on the eve of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum (11–13 March).
2022-03-29	Russian and Ukrainian delegations meet at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan addressing them. The talks did not produce a settlement.
2022-05/06	UN Secretary-General António Guterres proposes a package linking Ukrainian grain exports with facilitation of Russian food and fertilizer exports; Turkish officials hold parallel talks in Ankara and Moscow.
2022-07-13	A military-technical meeting of Turkish, Russian, Ukrainian and UN delegations is held in Istanbul.
2022-07-22	The Initiative is signed at Dolmabahçe Palace in the presence of Erdoğan and Guterres.
2022-08-01	The first cargo ship, the Razoni, leaves Odesa.
2022-10-29 / 11-02	Russia suspends participation after an attack on its Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol, then resumes after contacts involving Türkiye and the UN.
2022-11 / 2023-03 / 2023-05	The deal is extended three times; the March 2023 extension is disputed, with Moscow saying 60 days and Kyiv and the UN saying 120 days.
2023-07-17	Russia announces it will not extend the deal.

How the deal worked

The package consisted of separate but linked texts: the Black Sea Grain Initiative itself, signed by Russia–Türkiye–UN and Ukraine–Türkiye–UN in mirrored form, and a Memorandum of Understanding between Russia and the UN Secretariat on facilitating Russian food and fertilizer exports. A Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in Istanbul, staffed by officials from Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine and the UN, approved vessel movements and organised joint inspections of ships at Istanbul to confirm they carried only food and fertilizer and no weapons. Ships sailed from Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi (Yuzhne) along a designated corridor.

Where things stand

After Russia's suspension, Ukraine opened its own temporary corridor along the western Black Sea coast in August 2023, and exports resumed on a smaller, riskier basis, while the EU's 'solidarity lanes' continued to carry grain overland. Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed reviving the deal in Sochi on 4 September 2023, but Moscow maintained that its conditions had to be met first, notably reconnecting the Russian Agricultural Bank (Rosselkhozbank) to the SWIFT payment system. In 2025, ceasefire-related contacts mediated by the United States raised the idea of a maritime arrangement, but no Black Sea shipping accord was implemented.

Istanbul, however, stayed on the diplomatic map. Direct Russia–Ukraine delegation talks were held there on 16 May, 2 June and 23 July 2025. They produced agreements on large prisoner exchanges and the return of bodies, though not a ceasefire.

Prisoner exchanges

Türkiye has also played a humanitarian role on detainees. In September 2022 it facilitated the transfer of five Azovstal commanders to Turkish territory under an arrangement among Presidents Erdoğan, Zelensky and Putin. They returned to Ukraine in July 2023, a step Moscow criticised as inconsistent with the original understanding. The 2025 Istanbul rounds produced agreements for exchanges on a scale of around a thousand prisoners per side.

Key Players & Positions

United Nations

The UN presented the Initiative as a food-security measure. Secretary-General Guterres and the UN's coordinators described the Black Sea deal and the Russia–UN memorandum as two parts of one package and repeatedly urged that both be implemented. UN officials credited the corridor with helping bring global food prices down from their March 2022 peak, and said that Russian food and fertilizer exports were not formally under sanctions but were hampered by payment, insurance and shipping barriers. The UN sent proposals in 2023 for connecting a Rosselkhozbank subsidiary to SWIFT, which were not completed.

Russia

Moscow's position, stated by the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Kremlin, is that the Black Sea corridor was implemented while the second part of the package, the memorandum on Russian exports, was not. It cited restrictions on payments, port access, insurance, machinery and spare parts, and the stalled ammonia pipeline to Odesa. Russia also argued that too little of the grain reached the poorest countries, and it described Ukraine's use of the maritime corridor and Black Sea waters in the war as a security concern.

Ukraine

Kyiv stressed that the initiative was essential for its economy and for global food security, and accused Russia of using food as a weapon when it suspended participation. After July 2023 Ukraine said it would continue exports with or without Moscow's consent through its own corridor, and it has pressed for guarantees of safe navigation.

The European Union and the United States

Brussels and Washington backed the deal and said that food and fertilizer were exempt from their sanctions, and that Russia's difficulties stemmed from commercial caution, not sanctions policy. The EU also developed its solidarity lanes to move Ukrainian grain by land and river.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Balanced engagement with both sides. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on 24 February 2022 that Russia's military operation was unacceptable and a serious violation of international law, and Ankara has consistently supported Ukraine's territorial integrity and does not recognise the annexation of Crimea or the 2022 annexation claims. At the same time, Ankara has not joined Western sanctions on Russia, arguing that it needs to keep channels to Moscow open to be useful as a mediator. Ankara argues that talking to both parties is a condition of mediation, not a contradiction.
Diplomacy as the aim. According to the Presidency and the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Türkiye hosted the Antalya trilateral of 10 March 2022 and the 29 March Istanbul talks, then used its contacts to bring the UN-led grain package to signature. Erdoğan has repeatedly called for a 'just peace' and offered to host leader-level talks.
Montreux implemented impartially. The Turkish Foreign Ministry explains that since 28 February 2022 Türkiye has applied Article 19 of the 1936 Montreux Convention equally to all belligerents, closing the Turkish Straits to warships of states at war, subject to the return-to-base exception, which is built into the treaty. Türkiye argues that this kept the war from spilling into a wider naval conflict. For the treaty's text and logic, see The Montreux Convention Explained.
Practical delivery and security. The Turkish Ministry of National Defence staffed the Istanbul JCC alongside the other parties and supervised ship inspections. Türkiye has since pressed for mine clearance and shipping safety, including through the Türkiye–Romania–Bulgaria Mine Countermeasures Naval Group agreed in January 2024.
Reform of global governance. Ankara links the episode to its argument that the UN system needs broader participation, summed up in its doctrine 'The world is bigger than five'. See Türkiye's case for UN Security Council reform.

Source Comparison

Question	UN accounts	Russian accounts	Ukrainian accounts	Turkish primary sources
Who brokered the deal?	The UN and Türkiye jointly; Guterres led the package, with Erdoğan hosting.	Credits Türkiye and the UN, and stresses it signed separately with each.	Credits the UN and Türkiye, and stresses it did not sign with Russia directly.	Stresses Türkiye's convening, shuttle diplomacy and hosting role alongside the UN.
Was the deal a success?	Yes: roughly 33 million tonnes moved and food prices eased.	Partly: the corridor worked, but the Russian export memorandum was not fulfilled.	Yes, and Russia's exit was a coercive act.	Yes: more than 33 million tons delivered, evidence that diplomacy can work.
Why did it lapse?	Russia declined to extend; UN says it kept pushing for both parts.	Western obstacles to Russian exports.	Russian leverage and attempts to gain sanctions relief.	Ankara regrets the lapse and continues to push for revival.
Role of Montreux	Little direct comment; the Straits were the passage route.	Notes Türkiye's restrictions on warships.	Welcomes the closure of the Straits to Russian warships.	Presents impartial implementation as the basis of Türkiye's credibility.

Much Western coverage frames Türkiye as an opportunistic middle power. Turkish primary sources frame it as a treaty-bound neighbour of the Black Sea with a stake in stability. Figures such as the 33 million tonne total are best read with attribution to the UN's JCC data, which Turkish officials also cite. For how Regionscope separates fact, position and source, see the Editorial Principles.

Black Sea Grain Initiative: the 22 July 2022 package of mirrored agreements enabling exports from Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi, plus the separate Russia–UN memorandum.
Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): the Istanbul body of Turkish, Russian, Ukrainian and UN officials that approved ship movements and inspections.
Montreux Convention (1936): the treaty governing passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles; Article 19 restricts warships of belligerent states. Read the full guide: The Montreux Convention Explained.
Antalya Diplomacy Forum: Türkiye's annual diplomatic gathering, whose 2022 edition coincided with the first Lavrov–Kuleba meeting since the invasion.
Related guides: Gaza and Palestine: Türkiye's Humanitarian Diplomacy; Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media; UN Security Council reform.

Regionscope presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources. — Regionscope Editorial Team

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Crossroads Review: Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War and the Black Sea Grain Initiative — Türkiye mediation Russia Ukraine Black Sea Grain Initiative explained: Antalya and Istanbul talks, the UN-brokered grain deal and why it ended.
Borders & Blocs: Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War and the Black Sea Grain Initiative — Türkiye mediation in the Russia–Ukraine war explained: Antalya and Istanbul talks, Black Sea Grain Initiative, prisoner swaps, why it ended and its limits.
The Political Accord: Russia–Ukraine Mediation and the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Türkiye's Diplomatic Record — How Türkiye hosted Russia–Ukraine talks, brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative with the UN, and why it lapsed in 2023: a chronology of Istanbul diplomacy.

Frequently asked questions

Who brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative?

The deal was brokered jointly by the United Nations, under Secretary-General António Guterres, and Türkiye, under President Erdoğan, and was signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022. Russia and Ukraine did not sign a single text together: each signed a mirrored agreement with Türkiye and the UN. The Turkish Foreign and Defence Ministries and UN officials all describe it as a joint UN–Türkiye effort.

How much grain was delivered under the deal?

UN figures put total exports at roughly 33 million tonnes of grain and other foodstuffs between August 2022 and July 2023. Turkish officials cite more than 33 million tons. The cargo left from three Ukrainian ports, Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi, after inspection in Istanbul.

Why did the grain deal end?

Russia announced on 17 July 2023 that it would not extend the deal, saying the part of the package on its own food and fertilizer exports had not been fulfilled. Ukraine, the UN, the EU and the US said the corridor itself worked and that Russian exports were not under sanctions. The dispute centred on payment access, notably Rosselkhozbank and SWIFT, plus insurance and port issues.

What role did the Montreux Convention play?

Montreux did not create the grain corridor, but it shaped the context. Since 28 February 2022 Türkiye has applied Article 19 to close the Straits to belligerent warships, and Turkish officials say this equal implementation preserved its credibility with both Moscow and Kyiv. Grain ships travelled through the Straits as merchant vessels under the peacetime freedom of passage.

What is the status of Russia–Ukraine talks in Istanbul now?

The grain deal remains lapsed, but Istanbul has continued as a venue. Direct Russia–Ukraine delegation talks were held there on 16 May, 2 June and 23 July 2025 and produced prisoner and body-return exchanges, not a ceasefire. Türkiye has said it remains ready to host further talks, including at leader level.

Cross-Publication Perspectives & Cited Research

Related Dossiers Across Partner Publications

4 Partner Desks